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INTRODUCTION

The respondent, ISIF, has filed its response to the appellant's opening brief in the above
captioned matter. As a result, the appellant/claimant is now filing his reply brief Following his
review of the ISIF's response brief, the claimant is willing to point out the basic problems as
contained in this response. The ISIF has attempted to avoid the basic errors of fact and law as
contained in the findings of fact and order of the Industrial Commission by virtue of reframing
the issues of this case and supporting this argument by suggesting an improper standard of
review. Although the claimant would suggest that the Commission has committed gross error by
virtue of ignoring its own findings of pre-existing shoulder impairment when it found that the
claimant did not prove "the combined with" element of his case, the ISIF is attempting to
persuade this COUli to deny this appeal and is suggesting that the claimant "has failed to
demonstrate reversible error in the" decision of the Industrial Commission when it denied ISIF
liability. This attempt at reframing of issues is confusing at best and misleading at the worst. It
does not provide any meaningful discussion of the actual facts and law of this case and it does
not discuss the appropriate standard of review. For the most part, the brief of the ISIF does not
succeed in misleading any reasonable person willing to make a meaningful review of the law and
facts of this case.

ARGUMENT

a. The ISIF has not Filed Any Cross Appeal in this Case.
Although the ISIF has not appealed any findings of the Industrial Commission, it would
appear that it may be attempting to persuade this Court to reverse the Commission's finding on
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total permanent disability by virtue of its discussion of the facts and opinions of the vocational
witnesses. The claimant would urge this court to refrain from any effort to consider the issue of
total and permanent disability (or any other issue that may come up by virtue of the claimant's
appeal) since the respondent is not cross-appealing any findings of the Industrial Commission
and is not stating that it disagrees with any of the findings of the Commission herein.

b. What Is the Appropriate Standard of Review?
When attempting to focus on the issues that the ISIF may be attempting to support in its
brief, it is clear that the ISIF is urging this Court to conclude that the standard of review for this
case should be limited to an inquiry of whether the commission's findings are based on
substantial and competent evidence. This attempt at changing the focus of review is not
appropriate in any way in this case.
The correct standard of review in this case is one of whether the Industrial Commission is
correctly applying the facts and the law when interpreting any applicable work comp statute.

Smith v. JB. Parson Co., 127 Idaho 937, 908 P.2d 1244 (1996). In other words, this Court must
apply a much broader standard of review in this case since it is reviewing whether the
Commission committed error when it misapplied the facts and the law when interpreting Idaho
Code § 72-332.
Regardless of the incorrect standard of review, the claimant will discuss other standards
that may apply and attempt to distinguish the case law that may be applied by the ISIF herein.
The Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review over questions of law, but reviews questions of
fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's
findings. Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 47-48, 156 P.3d 545, 548-49 (2007). The provisions
of workers' compensation laws are to be liberally construed in favor of the claimant, as the
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humane purposes they seek to serve leave no room for narrow, technical construction. Kinney v.

Tupperware Co., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330,334 (1990). The Court must reverse the
Commission if the findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the award or order. I.C. §

72-732; Hamilton v. Ted Beamis Logging & Construction, 127 Idaho 221, 225, 899 P.2d 434,
438 (1995).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the court. Gooding County v.

Wybenga, 137 Idaho 20],46 P.3d 18 (2002). The statute must be construed as a whole, taking
the literal words of the statute, which words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,50 P.3d 488 (2002); State v. Hart, 135
Idaho 827, 25 P .3d 850 (2001). If a statute is not ambiguous, the court does not construe it, but
simply applies the ordinary meaning. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663,
735 P.2d 974 (1987). Unless the result is palpably absurd, or legislative intent is clearly to the
contrary, a court must assume that the legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute.

Aliller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986); Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 P.3d 445
(2003).
A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003), citing Jen-Rath

Co., Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330,48 P.3d 659 (2002). The mere fact that parties present
differing interpretations to the court does not mean, as a matter of law, that the statute is
ambiguous. rd. If that were the law, all statutes would be considered ambiguous. Id. If the
statute is ambiguous, then it must be construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to
mean. ld. citing Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986). To determine legislative
intent, the court must examine not only the literal words of the statute, but also the
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reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative
history. Id. citing Lopez v. State, Indus. Special In de n1. Fund, 136 Idaho 174,30 P.3d 952 (2001)
and Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 990 P.2d 1213 (1999).
It would appear that the ISIF is conceding that it has lost this appeal if the appropriate

standard of review is applied here in this case. Therefore, the claimant will discuss this case as
though this Court were applying the inappropriate standard of review as suggested by the ISIF.
This Court's review with respect to questions of fact are limited to whether the Industrial
Commission's findings are supported by substantial and competent testimony or
documents. Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion. Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179
P.3d 288, 292 (2008). Substantial evidence is "something less than the weight of the evidence."
The Court has indicated that "the substantial evidence rule requires a court to determine 'whether
[the agency's] findings of fact are reasonable." Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110
Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927 (1985).
The Court has been reluctant to find error in the Commission's determination as to the
weight and credibility of evidence unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Lethrud v. State, 126
Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995); Reiher v. American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 61,
878 P.2d 757, 760 (1994).
Regardless of the well established case law that suggests a limited review of any findings
that may be generated by the Industrial Commission, this Court has generally indicated that
Idaho's workers' compensation statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the employee.
The exception is when there is substantial evidence in the record that is conflicting. Haldiman v.
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American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 793 P.2d 187 (1990); Aldrich v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122
Idaho 361,834 P.2d. 878 (1992).
When applying the above inappropriate standard of review, it is clear that the
Commission has committed significant error that must be reversed on appeaL Mr. Hope has
presented evidence that he had a pre-existing shoulder impairment prior to being hired by Blazer
Construction in the approximate year of 2002. The Industrial Commission has found that the
pre-existing impairment for the shoulder (prior to the year 2002) was in the amount of 3% by
virtue of the medical testimony of Dr. Robert Ward. The Industrial Commission has also found
that Mr. Hope's shoulder impairment for his last injury in December of2003 was in the amount
of 5%. The Claimant has proven a total "combined with" shoulder impairment of 8%.
The Commission has also found that Mr. Hope's shoulder injuries (regardless of
significant low back impairments) resulted in total and permanent disability. Somehow, the ISIF
is suggesting that the Industrial Commission has not committed any gross error when it somehow
implies that there is no pre-existing shoulder impairment to combine with the 2003 shoulderinjury impairment to render the claimant totally and permanently disabled. The claimant is left
to conclude that the ISIF is totally ignoring the Commission's finding that there was pre-existing
shoulder impairment in the amount of 3%. Apportionment, according to the Carey doctrine,
would result in a determination of 37.5% liability on the part of the ISIF. Clearly the ISIF has
failed to show that it should prevail in this appeal regardless of the application of the wrong
standard of review.
The claimant believes that the ISIF has shown good effort in attempting to persuade this
Court to use the wrong standard of review. When examining the use of this tactic it would seem
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that the claimant's argument for gross error would be supported by this Court in the event it uses
the correct standard of review,
No matter what standard of review that may be applied in this case, it would seem that
the ISIF and the Commission have joined in an effort to create new case law or to persuade this
Court to apply the wrong standard of review in an effort to avoid attorney fees. Although it may
be possible to persuade an appellate judge to misapply the law by virtue of applying the wrong
standard of review, it is even more difficult to argue a misapplication of law when the standard is
much more broad. Smith v, JB. Parson Co., Supra. Regardless of attorney fees or the wrong
standard of review, Mr. Hope should prevail in his appeal of this case.

c. The IS IF Attempts to Discuss Case Law that Does Not Apply in This Case.
The ISIF brief contains many gross errors of fact and poor analysis of law in addition to
the proposed misapplication of the standard of review. One such gross misapplication and
analysis of fact is contained in the following conclusion of the ISIF: "[a]s the Commission
noted, there was no evidence to suggest that Hope's preexisting right shoulder condition made
any difference at alL" (Respondent's Brief - p. 12). Regardless of what the Commission and the
ISIF may think, the Commission also quoted a statement of Dr. Ward that would warrant some
discussion:
[i]t must be noted with this last injury and surgery[,] Mr. Hope has significant
disability. To put it bluntly[,] his shoulder is pretty well trashed! I doubt further
surgery would help and I would be very surprised if any of the orthopedic
surgeons would be inclined to use surgical intervention. He will have permanent
lifting, reaching[,] pushing[,] pulling and carrying restrictions ... (Claimant's
Exhibits - Bate No. 328; partially quoted by Commission in Findings at page 31
Paragraph 81).

It would seem that the ISIF and the Commission are attempting to create a new version of
case law that misstates the evidence and further suggests that such misstatements should be

6

supported on appeal by virtue of some technical (or creative) definition as provided by the
Commission and the ISrF in this case.
Although the ISIF and the Commission can both misstate the evidence when applying
any standard of review that they may choose, it is much easier to argue that the claimant has
failed to prove his case when using the vvTong standard of review. Regardless, of the standard of
review, it is quite clear that Dr. Ward was talking about all of the claimant's shoulder problems,
including pre-existing problems, when he stated that the shoulder was "pretty well trashed." The
argument of the ISIF (and the Commission finding) that there was no "combined with evidence"
must totally ignore the above medical statement that was substantially quoted by the
Commission in its findings. It would seem that the Commission and the ISIF are ignoring
significant medical evidence that they suggest should be in the record in an effort to deny
benefits in this case regardless of the appropriate standard of review. Such an overt effort to rely
on a technical definition would seem to fly in the face of the general work comp rule as
suggested in Haldiman and Aldrich, supra.
To be fair with the defendant/appellant in this case, it would seem that there may be
recent decisions of the Commission that may confuse and obscure interpretations of Idaho Code

§ 72-332. Although there may be some confusion as to how a trier of fact should interpret the
"combined with" test, the decision of the Commission in this case is very confusing and
convoluted. Regardless of any confusion, it would seem to be well established in case law that
the Commission should be able to find that a claimant has proven the combined with element
rather than add an addition evidentiary rule or ignore medical testimony as it has in this case in
relying on some technical and creative interpretation of case law. Such a conclusion in this case
would support a wholesale revamp of case law and further confusion. If the Commission and the
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ISIF are continually allowed to redefine what is and what isn't liability under § 72-332, support
of such findings would likely discourage further filings under this code and limit the liability of
the ISIF by virtue of some political scheme as employed by the ISIF and the Commission.

CONCLUSION
The ISIF has urged this Court to apply the wrong standard of review in this case. The
Industrial Commission has ignored its own findings of pre-existing shoulder impairment in the
amount of 3% and a total "combined with" impairment of 8% when it quotes the medical opinion
of Dr. Robert Ward and also agrees that the Claimant's shoulder is "pretty well trashed" as a
result of pre-existing shoulder impairment that combines with additional impairment as a result
of the Claimant's last accident in December of2003. The Industrial Commission has found that
the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled and that such pre-existing impairment was a
hindrance to employment. The previous decision of the Commission denying benefits and the
decision denying the motion to reconsider as filed by the Claimant should be reversed and
remanded.
Dated this

~ay of August, 2013.
ROBERT K. BECK & A
//J~)

Robert K Beck
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I't(,-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the[lj day of August, 2013, I served the original or a
true and correct copy of the following described document on the parties listed below, by
mailing, postage prepaid, or by causing the same to be hand delivered as noted:
DOCUMENT SERVED:
Appellant's Reply Brief
PARTIES SERVED:

METHOD OF SERVICE:

Anthony M. Valdez
2216 Addison Ave. E
Twin Falls, ID 83301-6744

D

H~Delivered
~ailing
~simile

Robert K. Beck

9

